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Abstract
Recently, deep neural networks (DNNs) have
made great progress on automated diagnosis with
chest X-rays images. However, DNNs are vulner-
able to adversarial examples, which may cause
misdiagnoses to patients when applying the DNN
based methods in disease detection. Recently,
there is few comprehensive studies exploring the
influence of attack and defense methods on dis-
ease detection, especially for the multi-label clas-
sification problem. In this paper, we aim to re-
view various adversarial attack and defense meth-
ods on chest X-rays. First, the motivations and
the mathematical representations of attack and
defense methods are introduced in details. Sec-
ond, we evaluate the influence of several state-of-
the-art attack and defense methods for common
thorax disease classification in chest X-rays. We
found that the attack and defense methods have
poor performance with excessive iterations and
large perturbations. To address this, we propose
a new defense method that is robust to different
degrees of perturbations. This study could pro-
vide new insights into methodological develop-
ment for the community.
1. Introduction
Disease detection using X-rays can be categorized into radi-
ologists diagnosis and DNNs based methods. Radiologists
diagnosis requests rich expert knowledge and experience.
Recently, DNNs based methods have achieved great pro-
cess in x-rays analysis, including classification (Wu et al.,
2019), segmentation(Cernazanu-Glavan& Holban, 2013),
detection(Rajpurkar et al., 2017). Unfortunately, DNNs are
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vulnerable to adversarial examples (Kurakin et al., 2016b),
and thus make wrong predictions when introducing small
and imperceptible perturbations to clean images. Recently,
many attack (Shi et al., 2019) and defense (Hu et al., 2019)
methods have been proposed on natural images for the
multi-class classification problem. However, analyzing at-
tack and defense methods on medical images for multi-
label classification task remains an open question.
Most attack methods focus on the multi-class classification
task, but neglect to explore the performance on the multi-
label classification task on medical images. Existing at-
tack methods can be divided into three categories in medi-
cal deep learning systems, namely gradient-based methods,
score-based methods, and decision-based methods. Here,
the Gradient-based methods calculate the gradient of the
specific algorithm with regard to the loss of adversarial
examples iteratively. In addition, gradient-based methods
constrain the size of perturbations to ensure the perturba-
tions are imperceptible to humans. However, many funda-
mental questions have not been investigated. For example,
it is worth studying whether more iterations and larger per-
turbation affect the performance of the attack methods.
Some defense methods were proposed to defense against
the adversarial examples and improve the robustness of the
model. However, these methods neglect the quality of the
adversarial examples in the adversarial training. In practice,
these methods are sensitive to the degrees of perturbation.
For example, gradient-based methods with different itera-
tions and constrains will attack models to different degrees.
Therefore, it is worth detecting whether the defense meth-
ods are able to defend against different degrees of perturba-
tion.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey on attack
and defense methods for the automated chest X-ray analy-
sis systems. Specifically, we evaluate the performance of
the attack and defense methods on chest X-ray images, i.e.,
CheXpert dataset (Irvin et al., 2019). Moreover, we con-
duct experiments to explore the influence of more iterations
and large perturbation for these methods. Last, the future
open research problems for both attack and defense meth-
ods are pointed out.
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The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We investigate the impact of the iterations and pertur-
bations on the attack methods on the CheXpert dataset
with multi-label classifiers. We found that superabun-
dant iterations and oversized perturbations will dam-
age the performance of attack methods.
• We evaluate the robustness of the defense methods.
Moreover, we found that these methods are not robust
to the adversarial examples with large perturbation for
the multi-label classification.
• We propose a new defense method to improve the ro-
bustness of the classifier. Moreover, the experiments
demonstrate that the proposedmethod outperforms ex-
isting defense methods.
2. Related Work
Deep learning on chest X-rays. DNNs have made great
progress in image analysis, such as (Zhang et al., 2019a;
Guo et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019b). The chest X-ray is
an important tool to detect diseases such as cardiomegaly,
pneumothoraxes, and consolidation. Many works have
been done using deep neural networks to detect diseases
from chest X-rays. (Lakhani & Sundaram, 2017) showed a
method to automatically detect pulmonary tuberculosis us-
ing convolutional neural networks. (Pasa et al., 2019) pro-
posed an efficient method to detect tuberculosis based on a
deep neural network with less computational and memory
requirements than those of other methods. (Stephen et al.,
2019) designed a specific neural network architecture for
pneumonia classification. (Saul et al., 2019) proposed an
architecture that consists of a convolutional neural network
and residual network for the pneumonia classification task.
(Wang & Xia, 2018) presented the ChestNet to automati-
cally diagnose thorax diseases using chest radiography, in-
cludingAtelectasis, Cardiomegaly, Effusion, and other four
diseases.
Attack methods. (Szegedy et al., 2013) showed that classi-
fiers may make the wrong prediction with high confidence
when suffering some imperceptible perturbations. They
also found models are vulnerable to the adversarial exam-
ples generated by other models, which is called the trans-
ferability of adversarial examples. (Kurakin et al., 2016a)
demonstrated that in the physical world, classifiers are still
vulnerable to adversarial examples, and they proposed a
single-step method and an iterative method to generate ad-
versarial examples. Based on these studies, many methods
have been proposed to improve the performance of adver-
sarial examples. (Brown et al., 2017) proposed a method
that creates universal adversarial image patches in the real
world. (Su et al., 2019) showed a method that fools deep
Methods Step (s) Characteristic
FGSM single-step with no iterations
PGD multi-step with a random start using a uniform distribution
MIFGSM multi-step add momentum into the attack process
DII-FGSM multi-step transform images with probability p
DAA multi-step apply kernel function to attack process
Table 1. Comparisons of different attack methods.
neural networks using one pixel, and (Shi et al., 2019) pro-
posed a method that reduces the noise of adversarial exam-
ples and improves the transferability of adversarial exam-
ples; (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016) introduced Deepfool,
which computes a minimal norm adversarial perturbations
for a given image in an iterative manner.
Defense methods. Adversarial examples threaten the se-
curity of DNNs. Therefore, many methods were proposed
to defend against adversarial examples and improve the ro-
bustness of models. (Hinton et al., 2015) introduced the
concept of distillation to resist against adversarial exam-
ples; (Kurakin et al., 2016b) proposed to use adversarial
training to defense by augmenting the training set with
both original and perturbed data using a single-step attack
method; (Trame`r et al., 2017) further introduced ensem-
ble adversarial training, a technique that augments train-
ing data with perturbations transferred from other mod-
els. (Guo et al., 2017) demonstrated to transform adversar-
ial images using cropping, quilting or total variance min-
imization. (Samangouei et al., 2018) proposed to protect
classifiers against adversarial attacks using Generative Ad-
versarial Nets. (Li et al., 2019) conducted adversarial train-
ing using triplet loss to improve the robustness of models.
(Hu et al., 2019) regarded the omnipresence of adversar-
ial perturbations as a strength rather than a weakness to
achieve a high accuracy under the white-box setting. These
methods influence DNNs in different aspects and show dif-
ferent performance against attack methods.
3. Attack and Defense Methods
The goal of this paper is to review various adversarial attack
and defense methods on chest X-rays. For attack methods,
we introduce five popular gradient-based methods. For de-
fense methods, we discuss a traditional adversarial training
strategy and a pixel deflection transform training strategy.
Moreover, we propose a novel defense method to improve
the defense performance.
3.1. Attack Methods
Given a classifier f : x ∈ X → y ∈ Y , the attack meth-
ods aim at adding perturbations to a clean image x to ob-
tain a new adversarial sample x∗, which is misclassified by
the classifier and imperceptible to humans. In this paper,
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we introduce five popular gradient-based attack methods as
shown in Table 1. These methods satisfy the L∞ norm
bound to restrict the size of the perturbations and solve the
constrained optimization problem as follows:
argmax
x∗
J(θ, x∗, y), s.t. ||x∗ − x||∞ ≤ ǫ, (1)
where J(θ, x∗, y) is a loss function, and θ is the parame-
ter of the model. For clarity, we formulate the adversarial
examples of the gradient-based methods as follows:
x∗t+1 = Clip
ǫ
x{x
∗
t + α · sign(Gt+1(θ, x
∗
t , y))}, (2)
where t ≥ 0, Gt+1(θ, x
∗
t , y) represents a certain function
generated through the loss about clean images, and x∗t rep-
resents an image generated by attack algorithm in t step,
Clipǫx clips the pixel values to ensure they are in the ǫ-ball
of the original image x. In the following, we will discuss
the motivations and mathematical representations of five
gradient-based methods.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Kurakin et al.,
2016a) is a one-step attack method. It adds the sign of the
gradient of the loss function J with regard to the image x
to the original image. In FGSM,
Gt+1(θ, x
∗
t , y) = ∇xJ(θ, x, y), (3)
where t = 0. FGSM is a simple method that does not re-
quire any iterative procedure to compute the gradient. It
is faster than other multi-step methods. In addition, it just
calculates the gradient once, and so the success rates often
lower than that of other methods.
Project Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2018)
is a multi-step method based on FGSM with a random start
through a uniform distribution U between -ǫ and+ǫ for the
original image. Therefore, we set x∗0 = x+U(−ǫ,+ǫ), the
Gt+1(θ, xt, y) can be described as follows:
Gt+1(θ, x
∗
t , y) = ∇xJ(θ, x
∗
t , y). (4)
Although PGD achieves higher success rates than FGSM, it
is more time-consuming since it calculates the gradient for
several iterations. (Madry et al., 2018) shows that models
robust to PGD are always robust against attacks that rely on
first-order information.
Momentum Iterative Gradient-based Method
(MIFGSM) (Dong et al., 2018) is an iterative vari-
ant of FGSM. MIFGSM applies the momentum into the
attack process to improve the transferability of adversar-
ial examples. In MIFGSM, we initialize x∗0 = x, the
Gt+1(θ, x
∗
t , y) can be defined as follows:
Gt+1(θ, x
∗
t , y)=
{
µGt(θ, x
∗
t−1, y)+gt(J), t ≥ 1,
g0(J), t = 0,
(5)
where gt(J) :=
∇xJ(θ,x
∗
t ,y)
||∇xJ(θ,x∗t ,y)||1
, t ≥ 0. MIFGSM main-
tains high success rates for white box attacks and also im-
proves the success rates for black box attacks.
Distributionally Adversarial Attack (DAA)
(Zheng et al., 2018) solves the problem of optimal ad-
versarial examples. The DAA satisfies the L∞ constrain
and it increases the maximum generalized risk by adding
perturbations to clean images.In DAA, we set xi0 = x
i,
and the Gt+1(θ, x
i
t, y) can be depicted as follows:
Gt+1(θ, x
i
t, y) = ∇xitJ(θ, x
i
t, y
i) (6)
+
c
M

 M∑
j=1
K(xit, x
j
t )∇xjt
J(θ, xjt , y
j) +∇
x
j
t
K(xit, x
j
t )

 ,
whereK(·, ·) is a kernel function such as the RBF kernel, c
is a hyperparameter,M is the minibatch size, and xit repre-
sents adversarial examples. DAA is a strong attack method
that outperforms the PGD in both white box attacks and
black box attacks. However, it spends a lot of time getting
the gradient of the kernel function.
Diverse Input Iterative Fast Gradient SignMethod(DII-
FGSM) (Xie et al., 2018) randomly transforms input im-
ages with probability p and maximizes the loss function
with regard to these transformed inputs. TheGt+1(θ, x
∗
t , y)
can be define as
Gt+1(θ, x
∗
t , y) = ∇xJ(θ, T (x
∗
t ; p), y). (7)
Here, the transformation function T (x∗t ; p) is as follows:
T (x∗t ; p) =
{
T (x∗t ), with probability p,
x∗t , with probability 1− p.
(8)
Specifically, we set the transformation as image resizing.
DII-FGSM improves the transferability of adversarial ex-
amples. It outperforms the MI-FGSM when attacking en-
semble models in the black box attacks.
3.2. Defense Methods
In this paper, we introduce a defense method that trains
models with clean images and adversarial examples and an-
other method that changes the pixels of images to destroy
the noise interference. In addition, we analyze the short-
ages of each method and propose a new defense method.
PGD adversarial training (Adv train) (Madry et al.,
2018) is an attack method that fools models with high suc-
cess rates. (Madry et al., 2018) found that models will be
robust against first-order attack methods when training the
model with adversarial examples generated by PGD. In ad-
versarial training, we train the models on the samples that
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combine clean images and adversarial examples, as recom-
mended by (Goodfellow et al., 2014)
argmin
θ
[
E
(x,y)∼pxy
maxJ(θ, x∗, y) + E
(x,y)∼pxy
J(θ, x, y)
]
,
(9)
where pxy represents the distribution of training data. The
total loss can be defined as follows:
L(θ, x, y) = λJ(θ, x, y) + (1− λ)J(θ, x∗, y). (10)
PGD adversarial training generates adversarial examples in
each epoch, it costs a lot of time to train model, and it re-
tains the high accuracy of the clean images.
Pixel deflection transform (PDT) (Prakash et al., 2018)
randomly samples a pixel from adversarial examples, and
replaces the pixel with another pixel that was selected from
a small square neighborhood. In addition, to soften the
pixel deflection, PDT also applies some denoising opera-
tions.
PDT transforms images before inputting them into net-
works. It reduces the accuracy of the clean images, but
defend against adversarial examples with different sized
perturbations in both white box attacks and black box at-
tacks. Furthermore, it does not require any training during
this process, so it is more efficient than PGD adversarial
training.
Our defense method. Adv train training models are able
to keep a high accuracy of clean images, but do not robust
to adversarial examples generated by large-sized perturba-
tions (see Figure 4). PDT changes the pixel of images to
defense against adversarial examples. PDT is able to ro-
bust to large-sized perturbations but reduces the accuracy
of clean images. In this sense, we combine the two meth-
ods together to improve performance. Specifically, we first
train a model using adversarial training, then transform im-
ages by PDT, and finally input the transformed image into
the model to get the prediction. Our defense method gets
higher accuracy of clean images than PDT and is robust to
large-sized perturbations.
4. Experiments
4.1. Dataset and Evaluation Metric
A chest X-ray is a kind of medical image that can be used
to detect many lung ailments. In the experiments, we
test attack and defense methods on CheXpert (Irvin et al.,
2019), which is the largest chest X-ray dataset, consisting
of 224,316 chest X-rays with 14 chest radiographic obser-
vations. To evaluate the methods, we select 6 observations
Model Parameters Image Size AUC
Densenet121 7.98M 224 0.87806
Resnet50 25.56M 224 0.87370
VGG16 138.36M 224 0.88378
Inception v3 24.7M 299 0.82679
Table 2. Settings of different models, i.e., number of parameters
and size of input. We also report the average AUC of each model.
of the dataset: No Finding, Atelectasis, Cardiomegaly, Con-
solidation, Edema, and Pleural Effusion. The training la-
bels in the dataset are 0 (negative), 1 (positive), or u (uncer-
tain). We classify the labels of Atelectasis and Edema as 1
and the other 4 observations as 0 when the label is u.
We use the area under curve (AUC) as evaluation metric.
The value of AUC ranges from 0 to 1. A perfect model
would approach to 1 while a poor model would approach
to 0.
4.2. Implementation Details
Training details. In the experiments, we train net-
works using clean images and samples that combine
clean images and adversarial examples. We train
Densenet121 (Huang et al., 2017), Resnet50 (He et al.,
2016), VGG16 (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014), and Incep-
tion v3 (Szegedy et al., 2016) using clean images and con-
duct adversarial training using Densenet121. During the
training process, we use the Adam optimizer with β1 = 0.9
and β2 = 0.999 and set the learning rate as 0.0001. In Table
2, we show the details about settings of the networks.
Settings of attackmethods. To evaluate the performance
of the attack methods, we conduct our experiments by
attacking a single model and attacking ensemble models
using four networks trained by clean images, including
Densenet121 (Den-121), Resnet50 (Res-50), VGG16 and
Inception v3 (Inc-v3) in black box attacks and white box
attacks.
In order to attack ensemble models, We generate adversar-
ial examples using an ensemble of three models and eval-
uate the methods using the ensemble models and the hold-
out model. There are three ensemble methods introduced
by (Dong et al., 2018). In our experiments, we ensemble
models together using ensemble in logits. It can be de-
scribed as
l(x) = ΣKk=1ωklk(x), (11)
where lk(x) are the logits of the k-th model, ωk is the
weight where ωk ≥ 0 and Σ
K
k=1ωk = 1. In our works,
we assign each model the same weight, and thus we set
ωk =
1
3 . In practice, we set ǫ = 0.3 to restrict the size of
the perturbations of each attack method. We input the log-
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Figure 1. The process of adversarial training. First, we input clean
images into model to generate adversarial examples. Then we
train model using clean images and adversarial examples.
Model Attack Den-121 Res-50 VGG16 Inc-v3
PGD 0.02704 0.28013 0.33482 0.45193
MIFGSM 0.02752 0.24133 0.31822 0.43765
Den-121 DAA 0.02665 0.25180 0.30802 0.41879
DII-FGSM 0.03194 0.19913 0.27863 0.43040
FGSM 0.29768 0.48566 0.48811 0.49160
PGD 0.16108 0.04050 0.35482 0.40288
MIFGSM 0.14699 0.03229 0.32746 0.37085
Res-50 DAA 0.14512 0.02114 0.32061 0.39489
DII-FGSM 0.12379 0.04133 0.28092 0.36885
FGSM 0.46772 0.29976 0.50658 0.47217
PGD 0.15223 0.14941 0.09472 0.37467
MIFGSM 0.13291 0.13353 0.09281 0.31479
VGG16 DAA 0.12333 0.13516 0.06760 0.34499
DII-FGSM 0.10633 0.10876 0.09185 0.35588
FGSM 0.48291 0.49232 0.33788 0.60106
PGD 0.54718 0.51072 0.56739 0.04509
MIFGSM 0.52933 0.47201 0.49618 0.04532
Inc-v3 DAA 0.45780 0.37316 0.38287 0.03989
DII-FGSM 0.52348 0.47961 0.49061 0.05153
FGSM 0.47323 0.50655 0.52806 0.20117
Table 3. Average AUC of untargeted attacks against different mod-
els. The adversarial examples are crafted for Den-121, Res-50,
VGG16, and Inc-v3. The bold blocks are white box attacks.
its into a sigmoid function and calculate the binary cross-
entropy loss at last.
Settings of defense methods. To evaluate the defense
methods, we generate adversarial examples using PGD for
adversarial training. The adversarial training process is
shown in Figure 1. In our experiments, we generate ad-
versarial examples using PGD with 10 iterations, and we
set ǫ as 4/255. We set λ = 0.6 and define the loss func-
tion J(θ, x, y) as a binary cross-entropy loss. During the
adversarial training process, to improve the AUC of clean
images, we pre-train the model using clean images with 6
epochs.
For the pixel deflection transform, we deflect pixels of ad-
versarial examples without the class activation map and
conduct non-local means denoising for images. To test the
performance of PDT, we generate adversarial examples us-
ing attack methods with 10 iterations and we set ǫ as 4/255.
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Figure 2. (a) shows an average AUC of models for white box at-
tacks that generate adversarial examples using Densenet121. (b)
refers to black box attacks that generate adversarial examples us-
ing Densenet121 and attack Resnet50 by different numbers of it-
erations.
Method Setting Den-121 Res-50 VGG16 Inc-v3
PGD
Ensemble 0.07746 0.07956 0.06817 0.0727
Hold-out 0.10428 0.14015 0.35561 0.35126
MIFGSM
Ensemble 0.07101 0.07283 0.05969 0.06690
Hold-out 0.07325 0.13158 0.33455 0.33658
DAA
Ensemble 0.03486 0.04054 0.02825 0.02896
Hold-out 0.09565 0.14172 0.30138 0.23225
DII-FGSM
Ensemble 0.06494 0.08326 0.07077 0.07547
Hold-out 0.0676 0.12341 0.14919 0.20604
FGSM
Ensemble 0.4909 0.47384 0.55429 0.53963
Hold-out 0.36769 0.44520 0.50624 0.55651
Table 4. The average AUC of the untargeted adversarial at-
tacks of the ensemble method. We study four models Den121,
Res50, VGG16, and Inc-v3. The models in the first row
represent the hold-out model. The adversarial examples are
generated by the other three models and tested on the en-
semble models (white box attacks) and the hold-out model
(black box attacks).
4.3. Attack on Multi-label Classification Task
Comparisons of state-of-the-art attack methods. We
conduct experiments on both single model and ensemble
model using the white box attacks and black box attacks.
For single models, from Table 3, FGSM has higher AUC
than other methods in the white box attacks. DAA outper-
forms PGD, regardless of whether in white box attacks or
black box attacks. In black box attacks, DII-FGSM and
MIFGSM outperform PGD. In white box attacks, they also
keep high success rates as PGD.
For ensemble models, from Table 4, we generate adversar-
ial examples using the ensemble models and attack the en-
semble models and hold-out models in the white box at-
tacks and black box attacks. DAA generates adversarial ex-
amples with stronger attack abilities than those of PGD in
both white box attacks and black box attacks. DII-FGSM
and MIFGSM get lower AUC than those of PGD in the
black box attacks. In addition, the adversarial examples
generated by DII-FGSM with ensemble models have bet-
ter transferability than that of MIFGSM in the black box
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Figure 3. (a) shows average AUC of attacking models with differ-
ent ǫ in the white box attacks, (b) represents the average distance
between clean images and adversarial examples. The adversarial
examples are generated by Densenet121.
attacks.
Impact of iterations number. To study the impact of the
number of iterations for attack methods, we conduct experi-
ments with different numbers of iterations in the white box
attacks and black box attacks. From Figure 2, when the
number of iterations increases from 0 to 10, the average
AUC drops sharply. The results demonstrate that increas-
ing too much noise in images might not always work well
when attacking models. In the white box attacks, the av-
erage AUC keeps fluctuating and does not decrease as the
number of iterations increases. In the black box attacks,
adversarial examples attack other models due to the trans-
ferability. The results show that too much noise weakens
the transferability of adversarial examples and reduces the
success rates of black box attacks.
Influence of perturbations size. To investigate how the
size of perturbations affects adversarial examples, we set
the number of iterations as 40 and apply the l2 distance to
evaluate the distance between the adversarial examples and
clean images with different ǫ. From Figure 3 (a), the aver-
age AUC quickly drops when ǫ is smaller than 0.1. When
ǫ is more than 0.25, the average AUC of the DII-FGSM
begins to rise, and the average AUC of PGD and DAA be-
gin to rise when ǫ is equal to 0.3. From Figure 3 (b), the
distance between adversarial examples and the correspond-
ing clean images steadily rises as ǫ increases. When ǫ is
large enough, the distance stops growing and even declines.
It also shows that MIFGSM gets the largest distance in all
methods. Thus, too large-sized perturbations do not always
lead to good attack performance. When ǫ is smaller, the dis-
tance rises smoothly. When ǫ increase, the distance drops
and the performance of attack methods decrease.
4.4. Defense on Multi-label Classification Task
PGD adversarial training is a method that improves the ro-
bustness of models by training with adversarial examples
Method Den-PGDmulti Den-121 Res-50
PGD 0.80735 0.85294 0.84494
MIFGSM 0.80376 0.81709 0.80437
DAA 0.83554 0.86454 0.85925
DII-FGSM 0.80813 0.84649 0.8364
FGSM 0.85801 0.85185 0.84008
Table 5. The average AUC of untargeted attacks for PGD ad-
versarial training on multi-label classifiers. Den-PGDmulti rep-
resents the model trained by the PGD adversarial training with
Densenet121 as the multi-label classifier. Den-121 represents the
Densenet121 trained just using clean images. During the experi-
ments, we set Den-PGDmulti as the target models and generate
adversarial examples using Den-PGDmulti, Den-121, and Res-
50.
Method Den-121 Res-50 VGG16
PGD 0.68788 0.69659 0.67024
MIFGSM 0.68143 0.69564 0.66539
DAA 0.68847 0.69761 0.67078
DII-FGSM 0.68538 0.69683 0.66911
FGSM 0.69355 0.70093 0.67431
Table 6. The average AUC of the Pixel Deflection Transform.
The adversarial examples are generated by Den-121. Den-121,
Res-50 and VGG16 are target models.
generated by the PGD attack method. In the experiments,
we train Densenet121 using both clean images and adver-
sarial examples. The pixel deflection transform locally cor-
rupts the images by redistributing pixel values. We craft ad-
versarial examples using Densenet121 and input them into
Densenet121, Resnet50, VGG16, and Inception v3, respec-
tively.
Results of PGD adversarial training. To evaluate PGD
adversarial training, we conduct the experiment on the
multi-label classifier using the data set that contains six ob-
servations from CheXpert. From the experiment, the aver-
age AUC of clean images is 0.87633, which still retains a
high value. Table 5 shows the results of adversarial train-
ing on the multi-label classifier. In both black box attacks
and white box attacks, the AUC of all methods is over 0.8.
The MIFGSM has the lowest AUC in multi-step attacks,
and DAA has the highest AUC in multi-step attacks in both
black box attacks and white box attacks.
Results of pixel deflecting transform. To evaluate the
pixel deflecting transform, we conduct an experiment on
the multi-label classifier with six observations from CheX-
pert. From the experiments, The AUC of the clean images
for Densenet121 is 0.70302, which is lower than that of
PGD adversarial training. Table 6 shows the pixel deflec-
tion transform results. In the white box attacks, AUC is
over 0.68. In the black box attacks, AUC also retains high
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Figure 4. The results of different ǫ for the three defense methods.
For PDT and PDT&Adv train, we generate adversarial examples
with PGD using Densenet121. For Adv train, we generate adver-
sarial examples with PGD using Den-PGDmulti.
values as in the white box attacks. It shows that PDT is ro-
bust to adversarial examples in both white box attacks and
black box attacks, but PDT is less accurate for clean images
than PGD adversarial training. In this experiment, PDT just
deflects pixels of images without any training procedure, so
it consumes less time than adversarial training.
Results of our defense method. In this part, we combine
the pixel deflecting transform with PGD adversarial train-
ing (PDT&Adv train). First, we train Densenet121 using
the multi-label classifier with samples that combine adver-
sarial examples and clean images. Then, we process the
images using PDT and input them into the network trained
by PGD adversarial training. At last, we compare the meth-
ods with PDT and PGD adversarial training, respectively,
with different sized perturbations. We show the results in
Figure 4.
Figure 4 shows PDT&Adv train is superior to PDT with
various ǫ. As ǫ increases, AUC of Adv train declines
and AUC of PDT and PDT&Adv train remain steady.
Adv train has the highest AUC over other two methods
when ǫ is smaller than 0.03. PDT&Adv train outperforms
Adv train when ǫ is over 0.03. The results demonstrate
that PGD adversarial training and PDT are able to defend
against adversarial examples. PGD adversarial training re-
tains more accurate clean images than those of PDT. More-
over, when ǫ increases, AUC of PGD adversarial training
drops sharply. Combining PGD adversarial training and
PDT achieves better performance than that of PDT and
keeps AUC steady as ǫ increases.
5. Discussions and Challenges
In this section, we will discuss the challenges for attacks
and defense when analyzing chest X-rays. Moreover, we
discuss the perturbations and robustness of models.
Attack and defense on multi-label classification. Most
attack and defense methods achieve good performance on
multi-class classification tasks. However, multi-label clas-
sification is more difficult than multi-class classification.
Therefore, it is more challenging for attack and defense
methods in multi-label classification tasks. In the exper-
iment, we apply the targeted attack methods (Song et al.,
2018; Xie et al., 2018; Dong et al., 2018) on medical im-
ages on the multi-label classification task. However, these
methods fail to achieve good performance. The reason lies
in that these methods are not strong enough in targeted at-
tacks or these methods tested on multi-class classifiers are
not suitable for multi-label classifiers in targeted attacks.
Perturbations and robustness. In Figure 4, when the
size of perturbations increases, the average AUC drops
rapidly in PGD adversarial training. (Salimans et al., 2017)
showed that the distributions of clean images are different
from adversarial examples. In this sense, small perturba-
tions added into the image can change the distribution of
the image. Therefore, when we increase the size of the
perturbations, the distributions of the adversarial examples
may be different with samples used to conduct adversarial
training. Furthermore, models trained with adversarial ex-
amples with a certain sized perturbations may not be robust
to other adversarial examples generated by other sized per-
turbations.
For chest X-rays, most attack and defense methods rarely
focus on the influence of different degrees of perturbations.
In practice, we found that the degrees of perturbations af-
fects the robustness of the classifier. Therefore, how to im-
prove the robustness of the classifier to defense against dif-
ferent degrees of perturbation remains an open question.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we reviewed various adversarial attack and
defense methods on chest X-rays and compared their mo-
tivations and mathematical representations. Moreover, we
performed a thorough comparison study on the state-of-the-
art attack and defense methods for common thorax disease
classification in chest X-rays. This review revealed a limi-
tation of the existing attack and defense methods that they
have poor performance with excessive iterations and large
perturbation. To address this limitation, we proposed a ro-
bust defensemethod and evaluated its effectiveness through
extensive experiments. More critically, this review could
open a research direction for developing more effective
methods to defense against large perturbation and improve
the robustness of the models.
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